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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, electric utility executives studied options for new
generating capacity in the traditional way: the engineering department
determined how much each resource option would cost to build and
maintain, the fuels department determined how much each would cost
to operate, and the system operator projected the hours of operation of
each potential resource. The option that minimized the accounting cost
of generating electricity to meet the projected system loads was cho-
sen. The state regulatory commission, if it had jurisdiction at all, gen-
erally approved the choice, and construction would commence.
How times have changed!1 During the 1970s, far-reaching envi-
ronmental laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969,2 the Clean Air Act of 1970, and the Federal Water Pollution
1. The California Public Utilities Commission dismisses this past planning exercise
because "[s]uch traditional valuation neglects some aspects of the social infrastructure in
which electric resources play a vital part." Biennial Resource Plan Update Following the
California Energy Commission's Seventh Electric Report, 124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
181, 194 (Cal. P.U.C. 1991) [hereinafter Biennial Resource Plan Update].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(b) (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
[Vol. 95:839
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Control Act Amendments of 1972,4 required more detailed study of
the environmental and societal effects of these options. These consider-
ations resulted in, among other things, technological advancements, site
location compromises, and the inclusion of new emission-reducing
systems to mitigate the environmental effects of generating electricity.
During the 1980s, the effects of the passage of the Public Utility Reg-
ulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)5 began to be realized as a vari-
ety of nonutility owned generating resources began to compete with
electric utilities for the right to supply the next required generating
unit.6 In short, toward the end of the 1980s, the electric utility's sys-
tem planning had become necessarily more complex and more sophisti-
cated and its results less predictable. Despite these new factors, the
process was still generally driven by an economic analysis of alterna-
tives developed on the basis of accounting costs.7
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
5. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1989) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 824a-3, 2011, 2601-2603, 2611-2613, 2621-2627, 2631-2634, 2641-2645, 2701-2708
(1988)).
6. PURPA requires electric utilities to pay for power from qualifying cogenerators
and small power producers (QFs) at a price that does not exceed the utility's "incremental
cost . . . of alternative electric energy." 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1988). The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission adopted implementing regulations of PURPA and required that costs
paid to QFs be based on the utility's "avoided costs." 18 C.F.R. § 292.304 (1992). The
determination of avoided costs has been controversial; nevertheless, the calculations generally
have been based on estimates of future accounting costs.
7. Section 111 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat.
2776 (1992) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 2601 and following), (the "1992 Act") requires each
electric utility to "employ integrated resource planning" and allows for "the opportunity for
public participation and comment" in the creation of such a plan. The term "integrated
resource planning" is defined to require "a planning and selection process for new energy
resources that evaluates the full range of alternatives . . . in order to provide adequate and
reliable service to its electric customers at the lowest system cost." 1992 Act, § 111(d)(19),
106 Stat. at 2796. The term "system cost" means "all direct and quantifiable net costs for
an energy resource."
The 1992 Act passed the House of Representatives with a specific requirement to
include consideration of externalities: "The utility's least cost plans shall include, to the
greatest extent practicable, the external costs and benefits of providing electric service, in-
cluding but not limited to environmental impacts, maintaining access to foreign and domestic
sources of supply, employment opportunities, economic development, and health." 138 CONG.
REC. H3515 (daily ed. May 20, 1992). That provision was dropped in the Conference
Committee's report of the 1992 Act.
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Just as the electric utility planners were getting comfortable with
these analytical complexities in studying generation expansion plans, a
new, potentially overwhelming, regulatory concept arose in several
states: the requirement in the resource planning exercise to increase the
projected costs of coal-fired generation to reflect the additional costs to
society "wherever they may occur, which result from harm or risks of
harm to the environment after the application of all mitigation mea-
sures required by existing environmental regulation."8 These costs
have been labeled "externalities" because they are not internalized; that
is, they are not accounted for in the projected costs of the construction
of a new generating unit.9 The effect of monetizing externalities has
had the most effect on coal-fired generation resources. Imputing these
external costs to coal-fired generation increases significantly the pro-
jected cost of generating electricity with coal, thereby damaging, if not
destroying, the likelihood that coal generation can emerge as a least-
cost alternative in a generation expansion exercise.10
The debate is not whether externalities exist-they surely do exist,
both positively and negatively, throughout society as a result of all
types of production activities. Rather, the debate is whether the mone-
tization of externalities is economically efficient, whether the whole
range of externalities can be monetized today with reasonable certainty,
whether they should be applied virtually exclusively to coal-fired elec-
tric generation in the resource planning process, and whether it is
appropriate for individual states to impose these external costs without
a more coordinated approach in society as a whole.
8. Rulemaking Regarding Resource Planning Changes Pursuant to S.B. 497, 119 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 257, 268 (Nev. P.S.C. 1991).
9. "Externalities are defined as all the costs and benefits not borne by producers or
consumers in the course of production or consumption." Marc W. Goldsmith, Comments
Before the Georgia Public Service Commission, Dkts. 4131-U and 4134-U at 6; see discus-
sion infra part lI.A.
10. Professor Paul L. Joskow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has stated
that the addition of externalities as now calculated by several of the regulatory commissions
can be determinative in the resource planning exercise: "The cost of control approach [to
determine the value of externalities] yields very high numbers that have absolutely no rela-
tionship to environmental damages ... . They are often so high that the choice of adders
completely dominates the resource selection process." Paul L. Joskow, Externalities: Let's
Do It Right!, ELEcRmcrrY I., May 1992, at 60.
[Vol. 95:839
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This Article will discuss the nature of externalities and the need to
analyze the societal costs and benefits of imposing externalities in the
generating resource selection process. Thereafter, specific examples of
the use of externalities by several state regulatory agencies in the
resource planning process will be examined. The Article will conclude
with a critique of the persuasiveness of the environmental data under-
lying these regulatory decisions and the general inappropriateness of
imputing a monetary value to these externalities given the existing
legislative and regulatory structure in place to mitigate emissions.
II. ExTERNALIEs-AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
A. Externalities Defined
Externalities are defined as costs imposed on a party by the ac-
tions of another party that are not borne by the acting party." In the
course of its activities or operations, an economic unit-an individual,
firm, municipality or public agency-may, in addition to its costs of
operation, impose costs on others. 12 The smoke emitted by a factory
may impose costs on a nearby laundry; the effluent from the laundry
may increase the cost of providing drinking water to the nearby com-
munity. Because these third-party costs (or benefits) do not influence
the behavior of the acting party-they are not "internalized" by the
acting party-the actions of such party are not efficient from an eco-
nomic perspective.13
11. PAUL SAMUELSON & WILLIAM NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 44 (13th ed. 1989). For a
rigorous definition and a more complete discussion of externalities, see James Buchanan &
William Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962). Externalities arise when volun-
tary economic activities of one entity affect the interests of another economic entity in a
way that does not create a legally cognizable right of compensation or redress. Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15-28 (1960).
12. Externalities can be "positive" as well as "negative." Activities of one person can
bestow benefits on independent third parties.
13. RIcHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., EcONOMICS 412-13 (8th ed. 1987). Efficiency is de-
fined as the absence of waste or using the economy's resources as effectively as possible to
satisfy the needs of individuals. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUs, supra note 11, at 27-28.
19931
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1. Externalities and Economic Efficiency
When a firmn purchases and uses a scarce resource, the value of
the output derived from the use of that resource must justify the cost
of the resource. This ensures that the resources are used efficiently.
However, when a firm dirties the air or water without paying for it,
costs are imposed on society that are not paid for by the producer and
are not justified by the value to consumers of the goods produced by
the firm. Because the firm is able to produce goods using resources or
imposing costs it does not pay for, the result will be that (1) more of
the output will be produced than is justified on an economic basis, and
(2) too much of the free resource will be used in the production of a
given amount of output.14 The opposite will be true in the case of a
positive externality. If the externality is beneficial, the producer should
be encouraged to engage in the process producing the externality even
more than his private self-interest would dictate."5
2. The Case of Air Pollution
In the case of air pollution, when clean air is used but is not paid
for by the user, considering all costs involved, the output is too large
and the amount of pollution is too great. A firm maximizes profits
14. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 11, at 772. If the use of a resource is
costless, the use of that resource will be excessive, because, to the extent substitution is
technically possible, firms will reduce the use of resources they must pay for by using
more of the free resources. For example, assume waste can be hauled away or dumped in
the river. Dumping is costless; hauling is not. Because hauling and dumping are substitutes
in production, the firm will minimize the cost of production by dumping all of its waste
and hauling nothing. But if a cost is imposed for dumping, dumping will be reduced and
hauling will be increased to the point where the relative prices of hauling and dumping
equal the relative incremental values of hauling and dumping in the production process. For
a more complete discussion of the substitution of factors of production, see id, at 533-37;
EDWIN MANSFIELD, MtCROECONOMICS, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 167-175 (1988). This
excessive use of free resources has also been called the "tragedy of the commons." Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968) ("Freedom in a com-
mons brings ruin to us all."); see also ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER Er AL., ENVIRONmENTAL
LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 33-49 (1992).
15. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 11, at 772.
[Vol. 95:839
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where the incremental cost of the last unit produced equals the revenue
received by the firm from the sale of that unit. For competitive firms,
profits will be maximized where the price of the product they produce
equals its marginal cost of production.16 This is shown as point Q* in
Figure 1.
Figure 1
Price, Marginal Social
Cost Plus Private Costs
(in $)
Incremental or
Marginal Private Costs
Incremental Social Costs
A -Price = Marginal Revenue
Q, Q* Quantity
On the other hand, if the production process creates a negative
externality, there are costs imposed on society, "social costs," that are
16. LIPSEY Er AL., supra note 13, at 214-18. Competitive firms perceive that the price
of the product they produce is not affected by their level of output, so price and marginal
revenue are equal. If profits are maximized, price equals marginal cost. Id.
1993]
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not paid by -the producer. Economic efficiency requires that price (and,
thus, "value") equal or exceed the cost of producing each unit of out-
put, including social costs.17 If social costs exist, they must be added
to the incremental private costs, and the optimal output is reduced
from Q* to Q1. Thus, if externalities exist, profit maximizing behavior
by competitive firms produces an inefficient result."8
B. Internalization of Externalities
This analysis suggests that the externality must be "internal-
ized"-a cost must be imposed on the use of a free resource-so that
the use of the resource will be treated in the production process in the
same manner as other resources that pass through a market. The im-
plicit solution is to create an arrangement with respect to the free
resource that mimics the competitive market.19 An artificial price
could be imposed on the right to pollute (i.e., a charge for the right to
"use" clean air or water), which would be set at the level to cause the
desired (efficient) use of the resource. A price on emissions that is too
high would force the level of pollution to a level below that which is
efficient. In contrast, a price that is too low would leave the level of
pollution unacceptably high. One option is to impose a tax on a finn's
air or water emissions.20 Alternatively, marketable permits allowing a
specified aggregate quantity of emissions could be sold, allowing the
market for such permits to determine the price.21
17. IA at 248-50. The price of any good indicates what each consumer is willing to
pay for the last unit of the good purchased and, therefore, represents the good's incremental
"value." Id. at 248.
18. Id
19. Wallace E. Oates, Markets for Pollution, Challenge, May/June 1989, at 11, 12.
20. Id. A tax could be imposed on the production and sale of final product, which
would raise its price and reduce production toward Q1 in Figure 1. This policy would not,
however, have any affect on the over utilization of the ftee resource in the production
process; i.e., pollution will be excessive with respect to the level of output.
21. Id. at 12-13. To be internalized, however, monies need not be paid out by the
acting party. Costs will be internalized if the actor forgoes a payment or other reward (rev-
enues from the sale of a marketable right to pollute, for example) for imposing a cost on
another. Coase, supra note 11, at 35. But see Jonathan Hamilton et al., Production
Externalities and Long-Run Equilibria: Bargaining and Pigouvian Taxation, 27 ECON. INQUI-
RY 453, 454 (1989) ("Other . . . structures, such as subsidies for pollution abatement, sus-
[Vol. 95:839
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Pollution reduction has both a benefit and a cost to society. The
cost comes in the form of spent resources and potentially lost jobs as
pollution is reduced. Figure 2 shows that the incremental or "marginal"
benefit of reducing pollution declines as the level of pollution gets
closer to zero.22 The incremental cost of reducing pollution increases
as more costly measures must be used to reduce the last increments of
pollution: Therefore, the marginal cost of pollution abatement rises.
Figure 2
Laissez-Faire Q* Q1
Marginal
Cost of
Abatement
Marginal
Benefit of
Abatement
0 Pollution
If 'the government imposes a tax on pollution equal to P1, firms
will spend up to P1 dollars to remove additional or incremental units
of pollution, but the value to society of eliminating the last incremen-
tain a short-run optimum, but lead to a wrong number of fins in the long run.")
22. This analysis can be found in any basic economics textbook. E.g., STANLEY FISH-
ER ET AL., ECONOMICS 239 (2d ed. 1988).
19931 .847
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tal unit of pollution is only P0. With a pollution tax equal to P,, the
incremental cost of removal exceeds the benefit of such removal, and
the result is inefficient. Theoretically, the optimal solution is to impose
a tax of P* for each unit of pollution emitted,23 which will cause
firms to reduce their pollution to Q*, where the marginal benefit of
pollution removal equals the marginal cost of removal.2 Pollution
will exist, but the cost of pollution will have been fully internalized
and it would be inefficient to attempt to reduce (or tax) pollution any
further.
The cost-benefit analysis shown above suggests that reducing pol-
lution below the efficient level is undesirable from an economic point
of view. To reduce pollution below the efficient level will impose
costs which exceed the value of the incremental units of pollution
removed. Such a policy may cause reductions in production, which
may result in the closing of factories and the loss of a significant
number of jobs. Economic efficiency requires a balancing of the cost
of reducing the level of pollution against the damage resulting from
23. While it is possible to identify many of the costs associated with pollution, it is
unlikely that all of the costs can be identified, and even more doubtful that accurate esti-
mates of these costs across the relevant range of decision-making can be developed. ROY J.
RUFFIN, MODERN PRICE THEORY 475 (1988) ("It is one thing to consider the optimal gov-
ernmental action in the case of externalities; it is quite another matter for the government
to actually determine and carry out the optimal decision."). Numerous scholars have raised
concerns regarding informational and technical problems associated with government tax
policies designed to remedy the problem of externalities. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 11, at
41-42; F. Trenery Dolbear, On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 90,
99-103 (1967); Otto A. Davis & Andrew B. Whinston, On Externalities, Information and
the Government-Assisted Invisible Hand, 33 ECONOMICA 303, 316-18 (1966).
24. Assuming perfect knowledge on the part of regulators, setting P" and allowing
producers to adjust to Q* is equivalent to setting Q" and allowing the price of discharge
permits to adjust to P. In the fee system, regulators set the effluent fee to restrict emis-
sions to the target level. If permits are used, regulators set the emissions at the desired
level and the market for the permits determines their price. Oates, supra note 19, at 12.
Without perfect knowledge, marketable permits are preferable to effluent charges. Id. There
seems to be a consensus emerging among environmental economists in the United States
that marketable emissions permits, rather than effluent charges, are the more promising poli-
cy alternative for control of major air and water pollutants. See Paul R. Portney, EPA and
the Evolution of Federal Regulation, in PUBuC POLCIES FOR ENViRONmENTAL PROTECTION,
7, 17-19 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990).
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not further reducing the level of pollution." When costs are fully
internalized, the externality is eliminated, but pollution is not. It would
be inefficient, and, therefore, undesirable, to assess additional costs on
emissions if regulation has fully internalized the externality by employ-
ing, for example, marketable permits.2 6 In short, imputing external
costs to coal-fired generation without an evaluation of the incremental
benefits, if any, from doing so results in an incomplete economic
analysis and will likely lead to an economically inefficient result.
HIL. STATE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS'
RESPONSES TO EXTERNALITIES
The National Coal Council (NCC) issued its Special Report on
Externalities to the Secretary of Energy on May 21, 1992.27 The Re-
port included an up-to-date survey of the" use of externalities by state
regulatory commissions. Briefly stated, the NCC Report found that four
states have monetized externality values, and eighteen states have
adopted qualitative methods; still others are in the process of consider-
ing the issue.28 There are also several states that have not included
externalities in the planning process. A review of the logic and hold-
ings of several state regulatory commissions that have adopted or
rejected the inclusion of externalities will convey the general scope of
the issues.
25. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 11, at 773.
26. Richard L. Schmalensee, Testimony before Commonwealth of Massachusetts Dep't
of Public Utilities, D.P.U. 91-131 at 13-14 (1992); Joskow, supra note 10, at 55 ("More
generally, once we have introduced environmental regulations to control pollutants it is
incorrect to infer that anything more necessarily must be done merely from the observation
that there are residual environmental impacts."); see also Coase, supra note 11, at 42 ("The
aim of such regulation should not be to eliminate . . . pollution but rather to secure the
optimum amount of . . . pollution .... ").
27. NATIONAL COAL COUNCIL, EXTERNALITIES, A NATIONAL COAL COUNCIL SPECIAL
REPORT (May 21, 1992) [hereinafter NCC REPORT]. The National Coal Council is a federal
advisory committee to the Secretary of Energy with the sole purpose of advising the Secre-
tary in matters relating to the coal industry. The Council receives no federal funds and
relies on voluntary contributions of its members to support its activities. Ia at Preface.
28. Ia at 1.
1993]
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A. Massachusetts
In 1990, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU)
issued an initial order concerning integrated resource planning for elec-
tric utilities in which it analyzed and justified the need for monetizing
externalities in that process.29 Less than a year later, the DPU issued
its Implementation Order describing how it would measure
externalities, and it adopted a monetized range of values to be includ-
ed with the projected costs of a coal-fired generator.3 ° These proce-
dures were confirned, and the values updated by the Massachusetts
DPU in late 1992.31
The DPU stated in its 1990 IRM Order that there was "virtual
consensus" among parties that including environmental externalities in
the integrated resource management (IRM) plan would be a "positive
development that would allow resources with varying degrees and
types of environmental impacts to be compared more accurately. 3 2
The DPU agreed with that "consensus" and moved on to two imple-
mentation issues: how should externalities be estimated, and should
externalities be considered on a site-specific basis or should they be
generic to all coal-fired generating units?33
1. Estimating the Costs of Externalities
The DPU required estimates to be made for the costs of
externalities for each proposed project, taking into account the "partic-
ular. expected emission levels" of each proposal,3 4 although it ac-
knowledged that "externality values are highly uncertain."35 The DPU
rejected a simple weighting and ranking scheme in favor of the more
29. Integrated Resource Management Practices, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 67
(Mass. D.P.U. 1991) [hereinafter IRM Order].
30. Eastern Edison Company, 124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 243, 259 (Mass. D.P.U.
1991) [hereinafter Implementation Order].
31. Order, Dkt. No. 91-131 (Nov. 16, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Order].
32. IRM Order, supra note 29, at 87.
33. Id. at 88.
34. 1&
35. 1d. at 89.
[Vol. 95:839
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direct approach of monetization of each impact. In fact, where cost
estimates do not exist for the particular environmental impact, "the
utility must make its best efforts to estimate monetary values with
magnitudes appropriately weighted relative to better known values." 36
There are generally two methods for measuring the costs of
externalities: the "cost of control" and the "cost of environmental
damages., 37 The cost of control approach is described as follows:
"The basic rationale for using cost of pollution control as a measure of
the value of pollution reduction is that the cost of pollution controls
required by the government provides an estimate of the price that
society is willing to pay to reduce the pollutant."38 Essentially, the
cost of control approach attempts to measure the cost of installing
hardware to reduce the emissions level to zero. In contrast, assessing
the costs of environmental damage is not premised on the costs to
abate the pollution but rather requires "an estimate of environmental
damage values associated with each resource.,
31
The Massachusetts Electric Company opposed the use of the cost
of control method for several reasons:
36. Id
37. See discussion infra part IV for a critique of these types of studies.
38. IRM Order, supra note 29, at 91. The Tellus Institute, a proponent of the cost of
control methodology, has stated that because deriving actual environmental damages "can be
a large and exceedingly complex task, fraught with uncertainty . . . and the valuation of
those damages can be both difficult and controversial . . . many analysts have chosen to
use control or prevention costs as surrogates for damage costs." STEPHEN S. BERNOW &
DONALD B. MARRON, TELLUS INSTITUTE, VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALTIES
FOR ENERGY PLANNiNG AND OPERATIONS, Update 3-4 (1990) [hereinafter TELLUS REPORT].
This cost of control method has also been identified as the "revealed preference" approach
or "shadow pricing":
In this approach, existing and proposed environmental regulations are analyzed in
order to estimate the value that society implicitly places on specific environmental
impacts .... In analyzing the regulations, we can identify the highest (or mar-
ginal) cost reduction strategy required by the regulations. This can be taken as an
estimate of the value that regulators (and society) have placed on air emissions.
A[t] the very least, it can be argued that this value represents the "revealed prefer-
ences" of regulators, and that, to be consistent, it ought to be applied when deci-
sions affecting these environmental impacts are made.
Id at 4-5.
39. IRM Order, supra note 29, at 90.
19931
13
Gary and Teague: The Inclusion of Externalities in Electric Generation Resource Pl
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
-it tends to overstate the value of externalities;
-governmentally mandated restrictions on emissions have been
developed where the marginal cost of control, equals the marginal
value of potential environmental benefits, and thus, the marginal cost
of further abatement "must be greater than the marginal benefit society
receives from such abatement";
-cost of control equates inappropriately "two separate and distinct
concepts, the cost of controlling emissions and the value of environ-
mental externalities"; and
-the cost of control varies widely among utilities and, therefore,
cannot be determined generically as results from the cost of control
method.40
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the DPU adopted the cost of
control methodology because the political process has provided "a
reasonable, rough proxy for what society is willing to pay to avoid
environmental externalities.",41 The DPU's goal was a consistent meth-
od of valuing externalities to allow comparisons among various gener-
ating resources and conservation initiatives. The cost of control meth-
ods were deemed to be "the best available proxy" until comprehensive
damage cost estimates could be calculated. 42 The DPU adopted the
cost of control values of the Division of Energy Resources as follows:
43
40. Id at 91. Professor Joskow has reviewed both methods of valuation and rejected
out-of-hand any reliance on the cost of control method: "The highest cost of control meth-
odology is meaningless, arbitrary and capricious. It is not a second-best method for measur-
ing environmental damages. It is absolutely worthless!" Joskow, supra note 10, at 64.
41. IRM Order, supra note 29, at 92. The DPU expanded on this finding in the 1992
Order
Since environmental regulations are established through a political decision-making
process involving input from the scientific community, members of the public,
environmental organizations, and competing economic interests, the [cost of control]
method represents a reasonable proxy for what society as a whole is willing to
pay to avoid damages from pollutant emissions.
1992 Order, supra note 31, at 44.
42. IRM Order, supra note 29, at 93.
43. Id. at 98. Each of these costs was confirmed and updated to 1991 dollars in the
1992 Order, supra note 31, at 51 (nitrogen oxides), 48 (sulfur oxides), 54 (volatile organic
compounds), 56 (total suspended particulates), 58 (carbon monoxide) 76 (carbon dioxide), 78
(methane and nitrous oxide), and 91 (summary).
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TABLE 1
Summary of Environmental Externality Values to be Used
by Companies in Evaluating the Emissions of Energy
Resource Options"
Northeast United States
(All Costs are in 1989 Constant Dollars)
Pollutant $/ton $/lb
Nitrogen Oxides (NO)
Ambient Air Quality 6,500 3.50
Greenhouse 0 0.00
Total NO. 6,500 3.50
Sulfur Oxides (SO) 1,500 0.75
Volatile Organic Compounds 5,300 2.65
Total Suspended Particulates 4,000 2.00
Carbon Monoxide (CO)
Ambient Air Quality 820 0.41
Greenhouse 50 0.02
Total CO 870 0.43
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 22 0.011
Methane (CH4) 220 0.11
Nitrous Oxide (N20) 3,960 1.98
Each of these values must be multiplied by the projected emissions of
each option to obtain an additional externality cost attributable to that
resource.
2. Scope of Externalities
The DPU considered, but rejected, the inclusion of the costs (posi-
tive and negative) of externalities associated with:
-a specific site for the generating unit (e.g., visual, noise, and
wetland impacts) in lieu of generic cost of control values;
44. DOER Estimates (DOER Comments (Update), 4/18) (based on estimates provided
in the TELLUS REPORT, supra note 38).
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-fuel cycle (e.g., extraction, transportation, facility construction,
plant operations, and waste disposal); and
-economic and societal impacts (e.g., tax benefits, economic
development, research and development, and local job creation).45
In each case the DPU recognized the ultimate value of including such
costs but chose not to include those costs because of the difficulties of
calculation. The DPU urged each electric utility to continue to study
these issues.'
The Implementation Order followed the request of the Eastern
Electric Company (EECo) and several other small electric utilities for
approval of their Requests for Proposal to solicit power from QFs.
EECo proposed, among other things, to reduce the externality cost (1)
of carbon dioxide (CO2) from $22 per ton (justified in the Tellus Re-
port as the cost of planting trees to mitigate CO2 emissions) to $7 per
ton (the middle of the range in the Tellus Report) and (2) of nitrogen
oxide (NOr) from $6500 per ton to $5360 per ton based on EECo's
own cost of control from a 75 megawatt (MW) combustion turbine
unit.4' EECo also argued that the DPU-approved costs of externalities
discriminated against base load (i.e., coal) technology. 8
Several parties objected to EECo's proposed changes. Boston Gas
Co. objected that these proposed costs were 'insufficiently document-
ed" and cited "28 values from nine studies on the cost of reducing
C0 2, showing only one value less than $22 per ton, five of $23 to $28
per ton, and nine above $100 per ton., 49
The DPU rejected EECo's proposed changes to the externality cost
of CO2 and NOX.5 ° The DPU questioned the relevance of EECo's
claim that the CO2 value discriminated against base load technology
45. IRM Order, supra note 29, at 95-96. The DPU also did not monetize any of
these "costs" in its 1992 Order.
46. Id
47. Implementation Order, supra note 30, at 256.
48. Id
49. Id. Neither Boston Gas Co. nor the DPU seemed concerned that the externality
value of CO2 could vary so significantly from study to study.
50. ld at 257.
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because EECo sought a peaking unit. The DPU also found insufficient
evidence to support the new proposed costs.51 Again, showing little
interest in utility-specific costs, the DPU stated: "Moreover, EECo's
value for NO, represents the control cost for a utility-specific facility
size and type, and so is not representative of the value which society
places on residual emissions of NO.., 52
Nantucket Electric Company (NEC) argued in this same proceed-
ing that its externality costs should be much lower because NEC
serves exclusively on an island and the prevailing winds take the emis-
sions out to sea.5' The DPU did not argue this point but rejected it
because the values in the IRM Order "were developed on the basis of
global/regional impact, and are to be applied generically and consis-
tently across all utilities., 54
The DPU rejected for lack of record evidence, as it had in the
IRM Order, consideration of a multitude of other externalities such as
aquatic impacts, terrestrial impacts, fuel cycle, and solid waste dispos-
al. 55
B. California
In 1991, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), like
the Massachusetts DPU, required the inclusion of the costs of
externalities in the resource planning for supply options and required
their measurement through the cost of control methodology:
ICEM [iterative cost-effectiveness method] will henceforth reflect the 're-
sidual emissions' (those remaining after application of appropriate control .
technology) associated with the operation of any resource being tested for
51. Id.
52. Id
53. Id.
54. Id at 258. Professor Richard L. Schmalensee, Professor of Economics and Man-
agement at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, disagrees with ignoring site-specific
results: "Externality values for some pollutants should differ depending upon exactly where
the proposed power plant is to be located .... [It is surely unjustifiable to raise elec-
tricity rates to reduce emissions that simply do no damage." Schmalensee, supra note 26, at
23-24.
55. Implementation Order, supra note 30, at 262.
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cost-effectiveness. The (negative) value of such emissions will be deter-
mined using the principle of 'revealed preference,' which means that the
costs imposed by relevant regulatory agencies, for example, in requiring
certain pollution abatement actions, will be analyzed to calculate the im-
plicit monetary value assigned to avoid a given quantity of a given pollut-
ant.m
Also, similar to the Massachusetts DPU, the CPUC considered only air
quality values, although it stated it will consider additional impacts to
land and water values in the future. 7 Unlike the Massachusetts DPU,
however, the CPUC required externality values to reflect the air quality
within the region in which the electric utility served.58 Thus, for ex-
ample, San Diego Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison
were required to use the cost of control values derived by the South
Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), while upstate
utilities, such as Pacific Gas & Electric, serving in areas with higher
air quality, could ratio down the SCAQMD costs for NO. and the
"[v]alues for most other residual emissions should come from the Pace
University Study."59 Carbon -dioxide (CO2) was treated specially be-
cause of its status as a "greenhouse" gas and the concern for "global
warming." All utilities were required to include a cost of $26 ton in
1987 dollars for carbon emissions.6°
The CPUC decided that the projected cost of power generated
outside, but imported into, California also must be increased for the
56. Biennial Resource Plan Update, supra note 1, at 189. "In calculating the cost
effectiveness of energy resources, including conservation and load management options, the
commission [CPUC] shall include . . . a value for any costs and benefits to the environ-
ment, including air quality." CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.1(c) (Deering Supp. 1993).
57. Biennial Resource Plan Update, supra note 1, at 189.
58. I. at 195.
59. Id. at 196. The Pace University Report reviewed existing data to determine "envi-
ronmental damage costs (rather than control costs) resulting from electricity, services." RICH-
ARD L. OTrINGER ET AL., PACE UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEoAL STUDIEs,
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY 16, (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter PACE REPORT].
60. Biennial Resource Plan Update, supra note 1, at 196; see supra notes 44-48 and
accompanying text to compare Massachusetts DPU-ordered externality cost of CO2 at $22
ton in 1989 dollars. The Pace Study utilized an emission "value" for CO2 of 209 lbs. per
MvBtu, for existing boilers. PACE REPORT, supra note 59, at 31. Thus, at a "value" of $26
per ton of CO. emissions or 1.3011b., the "value" of just CO2 emissions would be $2.71 per
MvIBtu or about 2.7¢ per kwh in 1987 dollars.
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costs of externalities in the area where the electricity will be used.61
The CPUC rejected complaints that such a policy has California resi-
dents paying to clean up the environment in neighboring states. In-
stead, the CPUC held that the marginal costs of emission controls
"[are] the cost of abatement actions required in those air basins where
the utilities face major costs of compliance with air quality standards,"
and further held that to find otherwise would "confer an enormous
competitive advantage" on out-of-state projects that "foul someone
else's air.1162
A former CPUC Commissioner, Mr. Stan Hulett, took the CPUC
to task for these findings, calling them "terribly complicated" and
disastrous to coal-fired generation in that they
foreclose the potential of any movement of any'coal-fired generation from
anywhere in the Western United States into California ....
Arizona and New Mexico are also upset because the California mar-
ket has been an important market for them for a long time .... If these
plants meet federal standards, why should California impose a state stan-
dard on them?'
The supervisor of the CPUC's advisory and compliance division, Wil-
liam Meyer, seemingly confirmed Mr. Hulett's impression of the future
California market for coal-fired generation: "It [the CPUC's Biennial
Resource Plan Update] may very well have the effect of pricing some
dirty technologies out of the market."'6
The CPUC probably would not agree on the record with either
Mr. Hulett or Mr. Meyer because it believed its Biennial Resource
Plan Update properly balanced the interests of all parties:
61. Biennial Resource Plan Update, supra note 1, at 196. In other words, the same
electricity would be priced differently depending on whether it will be purchased by a
downstate or upstate electric utility for resale.
62. L at 196-97.
63. Kimberly Dozier, Hulett Blasts Commission's Externality Pricing Plan, ENERGY
DAILY, Jan 2, 1992, at 1, 2.
64. Id.
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Today's decision is a compromise that reasonably reflects the tradeoffs
society must make in everyday economic choices. At one extreme, envi-
ronmentalists who oppose all resources that increase net emissions will not
be satisfied. Our procurement process considers clean air along with other
benefits, and a bidder's other benefits may outweigh its residual emissions
in some circumstances where competing bidders have lower emissions. We
want clean air, but we are limiting the price we are willing to pay for
it.65
The CPUC issued its 1992 Plan Update Order on April 22, 1992,
following its review of the resource plans of individual electric utili-
ties."6 The CPUC reaffirmed the use of externalities and stated that
the "[c]ommission must and will continue to balance many electric re-
source planning objectives along with environmental quality., 67 The
CPUC, however, made two changes from its 1991 Order. First, the
CPUC eliminated the requirement that residual emissions be valued
uniformly regardless of where they occurred and allowed the value
assigned to depend on the location where the emissions were generat-
ed: The 1992 Order stated, "Emissions occurring in nonattainment
areas were still to be valued using the purchasing utility's marginal
cost of control, but emissions occurring in attainment areas [would be]
assigned values adopted by the Nevada Public Service Commission., 68
The CPUC stated that this finding was premised on the "drastic air
quality differential" that exists within California and within the re-
gion.6
9
The second change by the CPUC was to eliminate entirely the
need to account for externalities in short term-five years or
less-purchases of power:
We recognize that state policy to directly incorporate environmental costs
is a change. In some instances, the relative cost-effectiveness of proposed
purchases from fossil-fired resources, and in particular, from existing coal
65. Biennial Resource Plan Update, supra note 1, at 199.
66. Biennial Resources Plan Update 206 (Cal. P.U.C. 1992).
67. Id. at 219.
68. i& at 250-51; see discussion infra part 1II concerning the holdings of the Nevada
Public Service Commission.
69. Id. at 251.
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plants, turn on these costs. In considering these proposed purchases, we
make a crucial distinction between long-term and short-term purchases.
As part of our overall strategy to manage the transition to a more
environmentally sensitive resource planning framework, we will judge the
cost-effectiveness of short-term purchases on a private least-cost basis, i.e.,
without consideration of residual emissions. 70
These two changes assist the coal industry in that they revive and
allow, in the short-ran, a market to exist for out-of-state coal-fired
generation. The CPUC stated, however, that it will continue to study
uniform valuations,7' as well as the use of externalities in decisions
concerning the daily dispatch of generation resources.72
C. Nevada
The Nevada Public Service Commission has adopted comprehen-
sive values for externalities and has required all electric utilities to
include the values tabulated below in their resource planning.73 Each
company must use the following values for environmental costs unless
"the utility justifies deviating from these values":74
70. l at 223.
71. Id at 276 n.94.
72. Id at 271 n.23.
73. Rulemaking Regarding Resource Planning Changes Pursuant to SB 497, 119 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUPR) 257 (Nev. P.S.C. 1991).
74. Id at 268.
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TABLE 2
Valuation of Environmental Costs
Nevada Public Service Commission75
Valuation
Pollutant (1990 $/lb)
Carbon Dioxide (C0 2) 0.011
Methane (CH4) 0.11
Nitrous Oxide (N20) 2.07
Nitrogen Oxides (NO2) 3.476
Sulfur Oxides (SO) 0.78
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) 0.5977
Carbon Monoxide (CO)
Ambient Air Quality + 0.4378
Global Warming Contribution 0.03
Total CO 0.46
Total Suspended Particulates/ 2.097"
Particulate Matter
(diameter < 10MM) TSP/PM0
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) NAW°
NH1  0
Water Impact Site Specific
(Determined by Utility)
Land Use Site Specific
(Determined by Utility)
75. RL at 265.
76. The value is applicable to EPA attainment areas. The value for an EPA
nonattainment area is equal to or greater than the amount and is likely to be site specific.
77. The value for VOC has been adjusted to reflect the state of Nevada's status as
attainment for VOC. This value is representative of an actual cost incurred in Nevada to
control fugitive VOC emissions from gasoline. The value for an EPA nonattainment areas is
$2.75/lb.
78. The -value is applicable to EPA attainment areas. The value for an EPA
nonattainment area is equal to or greater than the amount and is likely to be site specific.
79. The value is applicable to EPA attainment areas. The value for an EPA
nonattainment area is equal to or greater than the amount and is likely to be site specific.
80. A national marginal control cost for H2S in attainment areas would be approxi-
mately $0.9 per lb. (OTA, 1989). The valuation of H2S in progress at this time.
[Vol. 95:839
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Importantly, each utility's resource plan must also include and
consider the "net economic benefits added to the state from each op-
tion for future supply."81 These economic benefits include those ex-
penditures within Nevada for land, equipment, materials, fuel and sup-
plies, wages paid for work performed within Nevada, and fees and
taxes paid within Nevada.
D. Other States, Other Methods
Several other states82 have adopted a range of other methods for
including externalities in the resource planning or procurement process.
The National Association 'of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) categorized these methods as follows:
Most PUCs [public utility commissions] mandated that utilities consider
environmental externality costs in resource planning and/or acquisition
processes, which is typically done in one of three ways. The first approach
lies on qualitative treatment by the utility during the resource planning
process. A second approach involves use of a percentage adder that either
increases the cost of supply resources or decreases the cost of DSM [de-
mand side management] resources in the utility's planning process. A third
approach involves direct quantification of the cost of the
externality ....
Also, some states allow electric utilities to increase their authorized
rates of return for the investment in DSM programs.
For example, by statute in the State of Washington, conservation
has been encouraged by allowing the electric utility to earn an addi-
tional two percent rate of return on the common equity related to the
funds invested in conservation." In Connecticut, Public Law 88-57
allows the utility to earn.a higher return on rate base associated with
81. Rulemaking Regarding Resource Planning Changes Pursuant to SB 497, supra note
73, at 266.
82. Eighteen according to the NCC REPORT, supra note 27, at 1.
83. S. D. COHEN ET AL., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTIITY COMMIS-
SIONERS, Executive Summary to ENVIRoNMENTAL EXTERNALTIEs: A SURVEY OF STATE
COMMISSION ACTIONS iii (July 11, 1990) [hereinafter NARUC EXTERNALIES REPORT].
84. Washington Utilities & Transp. Comm'n v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 74
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 536, 556 (1986).
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conservation and load management investment.8 5 The New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission allowed electric utilities financial incen-
tives for choosing effective conservation and load management pro-
grams:
When utility managers choose options that offer extraordinary benefits for
ratepayers, something over and above what prudent utility management
requires, financial incentives may be warranted. To the extent that the
commission wishes to influence utility decisions within that range of rea-
sonableness, to secure benefits for ratepayers that would not occur in ordi-
nary circumstances, it is appropriate to offer utility managers financial
incentives.8
These types of incentives for choosing conservation options are, in
effect, the imputation of "positive" externalities to favor a certain type
of resource planning option-conservation and load management initia-
tives-which, by definition, disadvantage other options (i.e., coal gen-
eration) in the comparison. These types of incentives have the value of
being simple to calculate (as opposed to quantifying externalities) and
the illusion of being straightforward to implement. However, no partic-
ular nexus between the benefits sought and the level of the incentives
allowed exists. In short, the incentives may well produce the intended
result of additional investment in conservation and load management
without any relationship to a cost-benefit analysis of doing so.
E. Other States Have Not Monetized Externalities
Many states have not adopted 'externalities for use in the genera-
tion planning processY Moreover, several states have rejected the
85. Regulations Regarding Gas and Electric Conservation and Load Management In-
vestments and Contract Procedures For Private Power Producers and Providers, 1989 Conn.
PUC LEXIS 11, 35-36 (Conn. D.P.U.C. 1989); see also Connecticut Light and Power Co.,
124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 532, 571 (Conn. D.P.U. 1991) (allowing a 3% rate of return
incentive to promote highly cost effective conservation measures).
86. Generic Investigation of Financial Incentives For Conservation and Load Manage-
ment, Dkt. DE 89-187 29 (N.H.P.U.C. Aug. 7, 1990).
87. NARUC characterized 24 states as not having adopted explicit procedures for the
inclusion of externalities in the resource planning process. NARUC EXTERNALrrES REPORT,
supra note 83, at 4.
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quantification of externalities because of the primitive state of the
necessary underlying calculations.8" The Idaho Public Utilities Com-
mission followed its staff's recommendation that the calculation of
externalities is "unsettled" and rejected the monetization of
externalities: "We find that the method for quantifying environmental
externalities needs to be further explored and developed to support its
use in avoided cost calculations. Until such time we will give environ-
mental factors qualitative, not quantitative, consideration." 9 The Utah
Public Service Commission reached a similar result to that of the
Idaho Public Utility Commission:
[U]ntil a better understanding of the problems of second best and global
efficiency associated with externalities can be obtained, along with a reduc-
tion in the variance of estimates of their associated costs, the Commission,
for now, will reject the recommendation to explicitly include external costs
into the calculation of least cost and the subsequent acquisition of resourc-
es. 0
The Virginia State Corporation Commission rejected consideration
of externalities in resource planning for several basic reasons: 1) the
federal and legislative branches, not the regulatory agency, should deal
with externalities from a broader perspective, 2) the calculation of
externalities are speculative, and 3) including only selective
externalities can distort the planning process and result in higher elec-
tric rates. Specifically, the Commission stated:
We believe that it would be speculative, and thus contrary to our legal
authority, to include adjustments in rates for external environmental factors.
Moreover, . . . incorporating selected externalities, but ignoring the impact
of others, could distort the balancing process and lead to economic ineffi-
ciency, resulting in higher utility rates for all customers .... Congress
and the General Assembly are the proper bodies to provide this [broader]
perspective.9
88. See discussion infra part IV concerning the environmental issues and the difficul-
ties of calculating externalities.
89. Washington Water Power Company, 135 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 382, 399
(Idaho P.U.C. 1992).
90. Pacific Corp., 35 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 306, 311 (Utah P.S.C. 1992).
91. Commonwealth of Virginia, State Corporation Commission, Investigation of Conser-
vation and Load Management Programs, Case No. PUE900070, at 13 (Mar. 27, 1992) (ex
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This decision encapsulates the policy arguments against the inclusion
of externalities in the planning process: speculation, selectiveness, and
broad governmental policies cannot be ignored in the consideration of
externalities by any state.
IV. RESIDUAL EMISSIONS OF COAL-POWER GENERATION HAVE NOT
BEEN PROVEN TO IMPOSE A SIGNIFICANT COST ON SOCIETY
Having described generally the methodologies being used in sever-
al states to monetize air emission externalities, this section describes in
general terms the federal legislative and regulatory programs estab-
lished to reduce air emissions from all types of power plants and
assesses whether attempts to value the societal costs of residual emis-
sions are appropriate.
A. The Clean Air Act Constructs an Elaborate Program of
Emission Controls
Power plants, whether coal-fired or otherwise, cannot be construct-
ed or operated unless they meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act
(CAA or Act).92 Since 1970, the Act has been effective in its two-
pronged approach to controlling most of the air emissions of interest to
an externality analysis.93 The first prong regulates emissions principal-
ly from existing sources by establishing national ambient air quality
standards, that is, ceilings on the concentrations of substances in the
ambient air set at the level necessary to protect public health and
welfare. 4 The second prong addresses new sources and requires them
to be constructed with state-of-the-art controls designed to achieve air
quality levels even cleaner than those mandated to protect public
health and welfare.
parte).
92. See supra note 3.
93. While there are many components of the CAA for the regulation of stationary
sources, none rival in importance the two discussed here.
94. As explained below, no new sources can be built if they contribute to an
exceedance of an ambient standard. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (1988).
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The first prong of the Act was designed to achieve the high prior-
ity goal of protecting public health and welfare consistent with statuto-
ry deadlines without reference to the economic cost or current techno-
logical feasibility of attaining that protection. 5 On the other hand, the
second prong takes advantage of the lower costs associated with in-
stalling emission controls at the time of construction, as compared with
retrofitting existing sources, thereby deferring further improvement in
air quality until existing sources are retired and new sources have
come on line." Thus, the first prong provides for relatively immedi-
ate, high-priority protection, while the second seeks to ensure even
greater-though lower priority-improvements on a slower timetable.
1. The First Prong: Ambient Standards
a. Primary Standards to Protect Public Health
The ambient standard prong of the CAA is comprised of the basic
building blocks of the federal regulation of air quality, the primary and
secondary national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). 97 These
standards regulate emissions from numerous and diverse mobile or
stationary sources that "cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.""8 The
primary NAAQS are standards of air quality that are necessary to
protect the public health.' They must include "an adequate margin of
safety" to account for uncertainties in scientific knowledge."° In
order to meet this goal, the primary NAAQS establish levels of ambi-
ent air quality at which there are no adverse health effects among
those segments of the population that are particularly sensitive to the
regulated pollutants.1 ' The NAAQS are not designed to protect
95. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
96. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1215.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) & (2) (1988).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(b)(1) (1988).
99. 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1)(A) (1988).
100. Id; Lead Indus. Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 1150 (citing S. REP. No. 91-1196).
101. By gauging the level of the primary NAAQS in reference to sensitive sub-popula-
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against all possible effects, but only against adverse effects on sensi-
tive subsets of the population. Therefore, air quality at or even below
the level of the NAAQS still may provoke responses in exceptional
cases. However, because the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
considers all known responses to sensitive sub-populations when setting
the level of the NAAQS, any effects caused by air quality at or below
the NAAQS cannot be regarded as threats to the public health." z
b. Secondary Standards for Public Welfare
The secondary NAAQS are to be set at a level that is necessary
"to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse
effects."' 0 3 Public welfare effects "include[I, but [are] not limited to,
effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials, animals,
wildlife, weather, visibility, climate, damage to and deterioration of
property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic
values and on personal comfort and well-being."'" Thus, the second-
ary standards call for air quality even better than that necessary to
protect public health and directly address the comfort and well-being
of individuals, a matter not addressed by the primary ambient stan-
dards.
c. Administrative Implementation
The EPA has thus far established primary and secondary NAAQS
for six pollutants: sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide; nitrogen oxides,
tions, the EPA ensures the protection of the general population as well. Such sensitive sub-
populations typically include, for example, children and all persons with asthma and other
respiratory diseases. The NAAQS are set at a level that protects representative members of
the sensitive sub-population, not the most sensitive member of that group.
102. In setting the level of the NAAQS, the EPA Administrator must make a policy
decision on which responses are to be considered adverse health effects and which are
either not health effects at all or not adverse. If later scientific knowledge demonstrates that
effects that once were not considered health effects or not considered adverse are indeed
adverse health effects, EPA may revise the level of the NAAQS to reflect the change in
scientific knowledge. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(B) (1988).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (1988).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1988).
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particulate matter, ozone, and lead."0 5 The existence of these stan-
dards confirms that the health and personal well-being of the American
public is being protected from these substances and that the environ-
ment is being protected from effects caused by air quality levels to
which human health is sensitive.
d. The 1977 Amendments
While the ambient standards program has been amended twice
since the CAA's initial passage in 1970, the basic approach has been
retained. However, with each iteration in 1977 and in 1990 the pro-
gram has been made more strict. In 1977, Congress added provisions
to prevent significant deterioration (PSD) in air quality in areas that
attain or surpass the ambient standards."° The goal of the PSD pro-
gram is to ensure that air quality in areas that attain the level of the
NAAQS will remain "cleaner" than that level. The PSD program limits
increases in emissions in attainment areas to specified increments. In
no event can emissions in such areas exceed the ambient stan-
dards.1
7
e. The 1990 Amendments
Although the CAA produced substantial improvements in air quali-
ty in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress further amended the regulation of
existing sources under the Act in 1990.08 In addition to greater en-
couragement to attain the ambient standards, the 1990 Amendments
deviated somewhat from one policy underlying the ambient standards
program by ordering substantial regional scale reductions in SO 2 and
NO. emissions from existing sources in excess of those required by
the ambient standards. In other words, these retrofit reductions were
ordered even in areas where the ambient standards or increments were
105. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1992).
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1988).
107. The Nonattainment Area provisions were also added to the CAA in 1977 to spell
out strict new provisions for areas not attaining the ambient standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-
7508 (1988).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (Supp. 1990).
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already attained. Congress rejected waiting for the effect of the intro-
duction of new sources for these reductions.
2. The Second Prong: New Source Requirements
The CAA's second prong was initially established in 1970 when
Congress enacted the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)
section of the Act."°9 As noted above, this provision requires the im-
position of control technologies on new sources of air pollution in
order to ensure that, as new sources replace old ones, air quality will
improve well beyond that established by the ambient standards as the
new sources' low emission rates substitute for the higher emission
rates of existing sources.1 ° In particular, the NSPS section authorizes
the Administrator of the EPA to identify categories of stationary sourc-
es that "cause[], or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare.""' Once these sources are identified, the Administrator is either
authorized to or must set stringent control technology requirements for
all new sources in these categories.
1 2
The PSD program, adopted in 1977,13 also includes a provision
for control technology. All new or modified major sources in PSD
areas must receive a preconstruction permit." 4 The administrative
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. 1990).
110. See National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 783 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (1988). The substances regulated under this section are
not limited to those for which EPA has established a NAAQS. Section 111 applies to "air
pollution" from stationary sources. For example, various performance standards regulate vola-
tile organic compounds, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.112, 60.312, & 60.606 (1992); fluorides, 40
C.F.R. § 60.202 (1992); and total reduced sulfur (TRS), 40 C.F.R. § 60.283 (1992), for
which there are no ambient standards.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1988). The Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources are contained in 40 C.F.R. § 60 (1992).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1988).
114. A "source" is defined as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (1988). A source is "new" if
it commences construction after the 1977 Amendments were enacted. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)
(1988). Modification is defined as "any physical change in, or change in the method of
operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by
[Vol. 95:839
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process requires, among other things, that the new source cannot be
constructed unless it agrees to install the Best Available Control Tech-
nology (BACT). 5 This case-specific control technology review basi-
cally replaces the NSPS requirements because the BACT requirements
are stricter.116
In 1990, Congress increased the burdens on new power plants by
requiring them to obtain offsets for their emissions of SO 2 from exist-
ing sources. This program was designed to preserve the gains associat-
ed with the emission reductions ordered under Title IV of the 1990
Amendments from erosion by future increases in emissions occasioned
by new sources and will be implemented through a cap on total SO2
emissions. Starting in the year 2000, all new sources must obtain off-
sets from the sources already controlled under the ambient standards,
PSD increments, and Title IV programs.1 17
Thus, Congress through the CAA has put in place an aggressive
emission control program. Although it is strict, the CAA typically does
not zero out emissions. Accordingly, a power plant can comply with
all requirements for ambient standards, increments, BACT, and Title
IV's SO 2 emission rollbacks and still be allowed residual emissions of
substances such as SO 2.
such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted."
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (1988).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (1988).
116. In recognition of the fact that some NAAQS are not attained in parts of the Unit-
ed States, Congress mandated even more stringent technology-based controls on all existing
and planned major sources in nonattainment areas. All existing major sources are required to
apply Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT). All new major sources and modi-
fications to existing sources must receive preconstruction permits that limit possible emis-
sions to the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) and contain specific provisions for
emission offsets from existing sources in the area so that emissions from the new and off-
setting sources, when combined, will result in lower overall emissions than were present
before construction of the new or modified source. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1988). In attainment
areas, on the other hand, BACT must be applied, but the requirements of the PSD program
permits the balancing of factors in specifying BACT. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1988 & Supp.
1990).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a)(1) (Supp. 1990). The cap is set at 8.9 million tons annually
and takes effect on Jan. 1, 2000. "
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B. The Available Studies Do Not Quantify the Effects of the
Residual Emissions
Taken together, the controls on existing and new power plants are
designed to suppress residual emissions to the level necessary to meet
the public's air quality objectives; regional SO2 emission reductions are
in excess of those required to comply with the ambient standards. The
question is whether these residual emissions have been demonstrated to
cause effects to the public health or the environment of sufficient
magnitude that they should be the basis for public policies that dis-
courage coal use with respect to other fuels.
As discussed above,118 most externality studies have relied on
two basic methods of arriving at dollar values for adjusting the ac-
counting costs historically used in private and public decision making.
These methods either determine the cost of environmental controls
required by governmental entities or assess society's willingness to pay
(WTP) to avoid the risk of environmental damage, often described as
the cost of damages from the residual emissions. Both approaches suf-
fer from important methodological limitations.
1. Cost of Control Studies are Methodologically Flawed
The cost of control method of valuation uses the cost of the tech-
nology required by statutes such as the CAA as a measure of the
environmental costs that result from the emissions that the technology
is designed to prevent. 9 Although the cost of control valuation
method is relatively easy to perform, it has serious methodological
problems. At the outset, the methodology assumes that Congress, when
it drafted the CAA, created a program that required EPA to peg the
marginal cost of control at the marginal value of econonic benefits.
The cost of achieving a particular air quality level, however, may not
118. See supra part MIA.
119. The Massachusetts DPU stated that the cost of control methodology monetizes
externalities using "the 'marginal' technology [which] is the most expensive control tech-
nology that society has revealed a willingness to require in order to meet environmental
objectives." 1992 Order, supra note 31, at 18.
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be considered when health-based NAAQS, are set. 12 Moreover,
BACT requirements are imposed irrespective of the level of attainment
of the ambient standards.' Finally, the cost of control is not a con-
stant. It varies from utility to utility and from plant to plant operated
by the same utility and cannot be calculated as a generic cost. 122
Thus, it is clear that the cost of control valuation does not have a
reliable frame of reference and likely overstates the value of
externalities.'2 3 One way to test this conclusion is to compare the re-
sults of cost of control studies with other public judgments. Using a
cost of control method, the Massachusetts DPU has chosen to value
SO 2 emissions at $0.75 per pound, a figure that produces a total value
of $36 billion dollars per year. 4 When encouraging the public and
Congress to reduce SO2 emissions under the 1990 amendments to the
CAA, however, President Bush stated that those reductions were worth
between $200 million and $4 billion dollars per year.' 5
2. The Willingness to Pay Approach
The most complete externalities study to use the WTP approach to
value those externalities is the Pace Report.2 6 The Pace Report pur-
ports to survey existing literature on the public's WTP to avoid the
environmental damage attributed to utility operations 27 and then
combines these results with another literature survey to find estimates
of the extent of damage. This combination develops estimates of the
value to society of reducing each pound of emissions.
In order to evaluate the Pace Report's results, it is instructive to
look more carefully at its discussion of the costs attributable to SO 2
emissions. The Pace Report began with a study of health effects.
120. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (1988).
122. IRM Order, supra note 29, at 91.
123. Id
124. Id, at 98.
125. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President Bush's
Clean Air Plan, June 12, 1989, at 4.
126. See supra note 59; PACE REPORT, supra note 59, at 20-21.
127. Id at 20-21.
128. This discussion excluded costs attributable to the effects of acid deposition. Id at
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It surveyed a number of studies and ultimately chose to use data from
a study commissioned by the Bonneville Power Administration from
ECO Northwest (ECO) involving a hypothetical coal-fired power plant
located near a highly-populated area in the State of Washington. ECO
estimated the health effects of SO2 by using a dispersion model and
linear dose-response relationships.1 2 9 ECO then relied on a previous
study for its risk estimates1 30 and wage studies for its final valua-
tion. 131 Rather than use these valuations, however, the Pace Report
substituted others. After surveying wage differential studies, the Pace
Report settled on statistical values of $4,000,000 in 1989 dollars per
statistical life and $400,000 per statistical injury arising from emissions
produced by electricity sources. 132 The Pace Report presented an esti-
mated mortality cost of $1.72/lb S02, which includes damages from
both S0 2 and sulfates, and an estimated morbidity cost of $0.05/lb
SO 2.133 The Pace Report authors performed similar literature surveys
for the costs of damage to materials and impairment of visibility from
SO2 emissions and determined that the total cost of all damages attrib-
utable to SO 2 emissions is $2.03/lb SO2.13
To establish the validity of this methodology, several issues must
be addressed. First, because the Pace Report is based on a survey of
existing damage studies, the validity of its results depends on the
validity of the underlying studies. However, the Pace Report gives no
indication that it has critically evaluated the work done by, for exam-
ple, ECO or Mendelssohn and Orcutt, the study that ECO relied on forMortality estmates.135 It would have been informative for the Pace
Report to have explained why the EPA has not used this study in
193.
129. Id at 195.
130. Id ECO relied on a 1979 study by Mendelsohn & Orcutt.
131. Id at 195-96. ECO relied on a 1983 study by Violette & Chestnut. ECO chose
values of $3 million per life lost and no additional dollars per injury. Id at 196.
132. Idt at 99. The PACE REPORT derived these mortality and morbidity cost figures by
surveying existing studies that valued mortality and morbidity risks as measured by society's
willingness to pay to avoid those risks or willingness to be compensated to accept them.
133. Id
134. Id at 209. The PACE REPORT valued materials damage attributable to SO2 emis-
sions at $0.12/lb and damage to visibility at $0.14/lb.
135. Idt at 195.
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setting ambient standards. 136 The Pace Report also states that it did
not independently review the dispersion models used in the ECO
study.137 Moreover, the Pace Report does not provide enough infor-
mation to allow users of the report to perform such an evaluation
independently. It is therefore impossible to have any significant level
of confidence in the Pace Report's results.
Second, the Pace Report implicitly depends on ECO's assumption
that the use of linear dose-response relationships is valid. Recognizing
the pitfalls of such an assumption, the Pace Report states. "This may
be an acceptable assumption over the range of ambient air qualities
considered in this study, but would not hold in areas with different
ambient air pollutant concentrations. " 1lm In addition, no attempt is
made to justify the "acceptability" of this assumption in the case stud-
ied. The linearity assumption is consistent with the fashion in which
Pace Report states its results: dollars per pound emitted as if each
pound of S0 2 has the same effect. This approach ignores the likeli-
hood that thresholds exist below which effects do not occur. This may
be true as a practical matter when the environmental receptors for a
particular pound of S0 2 are not sensitive to S02, or when the receiv-
ing atmosphere has different dispersive characteristics or different
background air quality.
Third, the Pace Report fails to establish the representativeness of
the study of one power plant in a densely populated area in the State
of Washington.139  Where there are other sources with different
emission characteristics, emitting into different background levels of
ambient air quality in different areas with different dispersion parame-
ters and different environmental receptors, the expectation is to find
136. EPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, a committee composed of inde-
pendent scientists that reviews the scientific bases for NAAQS, described Mendelsohn &
Orcutt's study as "not refined enough to provide estimates of the quantitative effect of
sulfate concentrations on mortality." Letter from Sheldon K. Friedlander, Chairman, CASAC
to Administrator Anne M. Gorsuch, CASAC Review and Closure of the Criteria Document
for Sulfur Oxides/Particulate Matter (Jan. 29, 1982), reprinted in 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926,
14,939 (1988).
137. PACE REPORT, supra note 59, at 195.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 195-196.
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very different environmental responses- and different social values for
those responses.
Fourth, the Pace Report approach to estimating the costs of mor-
tality and morbidity is inherently flawed. It was based on the differ-
ences in wages for jobs with different risks."4 The assumption that
people make employment choices based solely on assessments of risks
misrepresents the available data.
Fifth, had the Pace Report applied some reality tests, the validity
of its results would be easier to assess. The simple tests that can be
applied here produce discouraging results. For example, the Pace Re-
port valued all damages attributable to S0 2 emissions at $2.03 per
pound,14 1 while, using a cost of control method, which is thought to
overstate that value, the Massachusetts DPU chose the much lower
value for SO 2 emissions of $0.75 per pound. 142 In addition, applying
the mortality figures of the Pace Report to the country generally sug-
gests that 21,000 deaths annually can be attributed to SO 2 emis-
sions. 143 This is a staggering figure compared to the EPA's publica-
tion of the estimate of zero as the lower bound for this figure.1 "
Moreover, the Pace Report suggests three and one-half times more
mortality than morbidity, 1 45 when common sense indicates that the
former should be a small subject of the latter.
In the same vein, the materials damage and visibility portion of
the Pace Report implies a twelve billion dollar value to removing all
SO 2 from the air.' 46 The analyses of the National Acid Precipitation
140. 1& at 97-99.
141. a at 209.
142. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
143. The ECO study "implies an annual mortality cost of about $82.8 million due to
SO2 emissions." PACE REPORT, supra note 59, at 196. Division of that total amount by the
Pace Report's chosen $4 million per statistical life yields 21,000 statistical deaths a year.
144. EPA, Strategies and Air Standards Division, Office of Air and Radiation, Draft
Regulatory Impact Analysis on the Antioanl Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Ox-
ides (Sulfur Dioxide) VII-10 to VII-12 (May 1987).
145. The Pace Report values the morbidity damages of SO2 at $.05/lb. Multiplying 21.2
million metric tons by $.05/lb. yields approximately $2 billion for total morbidity costs.
Division of that total by the Pace Report's chosen $400,000 per statistical injury yields
approximately 20,000 annual statistical deaths calculated in note 143 yields the 3.5 ratio
given in the text..
146. The Pace Report estimates annual SO2 emissions at approximately 48 million
874 [Vol. 95:839
36
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss3/9
EXTERNALITIES-COAL IN THE CROSSFIRE
Assessment Program (NAPAP) indicate that there may be a practical
threshold for materials damage given that maintenance of materials
may have to* occur because of weathering, irrespective of the presence
or effect of airborne SO2.147 As to visibility, the EPA has not con-
cluded that there is enough of an effect to warrant a visibility-based
ambient standard." Until these issues are addressed in a reliable
manner, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the Pace
Report results are valid. Finally, the Pace Report did not consider the
benefits of coal use (such as energy security) or the societal costs of
raising the costs of electricity.
V. CONCLUSION
Requiring electric utilities to use externalities in the resource plan-
ning process is a current phenomenon that has been pushed ahead of
the data that can support the regulatory decisions. The CAA has been
effective at reducing emissions of many substances from all power
plants including those firing coal. The purpose of these emissions
reductions has been to eliminate the adverse effects of air emissions to
the public health and welfare. While these programs do not eliminate
emissions, implementation of the CAA since 1970 through the period
when the 1990 Amendments will have their greatest effect should sig-
nificantly reduce the residual emissions of power generation and their
associated effects. Efforts to estimate costs of these residual emissions
must use valid methods and reliable input data. A review of the avail-
able analyses and the criticisms of them suggest that the type of reli-
able information needed to evaluate these costs does not exist. Until it
does, arguments to depart from the approach adopted by Congress in
the CAA-by using other means to add to its regulatory pro-
grams-should be viewed with skepticism and be avoided.
lbs/year. PACE REPORT, supra note 59, at 196. Multiplying that figure by the $0.26 cost
attached to materials and visibility damages results in a total of approximately $12 million.
147. National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, 1990 Integrated Assessment Re-
port § 2.4.3.3.
148. See 53 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1988) (Proposed Decision Not to Revise the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulphur Oxides (Sulphur Dioxide)).
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